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Abstract—Telecommunications technology is making its way
into operating rooms by new developments in e-health. How-
ever, conflicts arise with existing legal principles regarding
data protection. This paper deals with key elements of the in-
teractions between data protection and evolution in e-health.
The scope will be the digital operating room, where differ-
ent health services and activities converge through networked
technology, raising a number of privacy-related issues. For
instance, the patient’s health records and tools for recording
surgical procedures could be integrated within the same plat-
form, potentially leading to sensitive personal data linkage.
Also the possible duration and reason of storage of surgical
recordings, is a matter that remains largely unresolved in cur-
rent practice. First, this paper will analyze the data exchanges
of the digital operating room. As these will include personal
patient data, it must be assessed whether and how the Euro-
pean framework on data protection can apply. Second, the
regulatory regime of the manufacturers of the devices of the
digital operating room will be analyzed. Can the current legal
framework relating to e-health provide for suitable regulation
for such devices? Drawing from experience gained in research
projects, this paper aims to provide practical answers to often
theoretical questions.
Keywords—data protection, e-health, privacy, telecommunica-
tions.
1. Introduction
The nature of the Internet has undergone a number of dras-
tic changes in the last few years. One of the most notable of
such changes is the rise of what is referred to as the Inter-
net of Things. This phenomenon can be described as being
the pervasive and ubiquitous interconnecting of all kinds of
everyday objects or rather: “things” that can interact with
each other and cooperate to achieve common goals [1].
Relying on the use of new communication technologies
including radio-frequency identification (RFID) and near-
field communication (NFC) the Internet of Things aims to
support data exchanges in the global supply chain, facili-
tating several aspects of daily life [2]. On a global scale,
the Internet of Things could help track the movement of
the many goods that are being transported every day, po-
tentially supporting the identification of counterfeit goods.
On a more personal level, a smart refrigerator could detect
when it is running out of milk and add this item to the
groceries list. This growing number of interconnections
between ever more devices will of course result in further
growth of the number of services that is already provided
online. Also, the amounts of data exchanged in networked
environments can be expected to increase exponentially.
Also in the field of healthcare, different kinds of services
are gradually moving towards networked environments. In
a first wave of e-health solutions, paper records were dig-
italized into electronic health records that could be shared
between healthcare providers. A next step is to use the In-
ternet as a medium for the delivery of healthcare services.
As diagnostic services in the fields of pathology and radi-
ology, for instance, are already widely delivered over the
Internet, this step is very much unfolding right now. This
use of the Internet for telemedicine purposes is only ex-
pected to grow, with trials already taking place in fields
like nursing, pharmacy and even surgery.
The delivery of such telemedicine services requires the
tools and devices that are equipped for use in a highly
networked environment in which many services are pro-
vided over a distance. Especially in the field of telesurgery,
this evolution requires an update to the regular equipment
found in the current layout of operating rooms. In what
can be regarded as a digital operating room, several types
of services such as the provision of health data and the mon-
itoring of vital statistics and different components such as
cameras, wires and surgical tools will have to be integrated
into a single device that is equipped to handle the data flow
with which it will interact.
This convergence of different e-health services, relating to
the use, transfers and storage of data can, however, also
raise questions with regards to the protection of such data.
Especially when the patient’s health data is involved, it will
have to be assessed what measures need to be taken to pro-
tect the patient’s privacy. This paper aims to address the
specific privacy issues that arise in the context of a digital
operating room from a legal point of view. First, it will
have to be addressed whether the current legal framework
regarding data protection can be applied to the technologi-
cal developments of the digital operating room. This anal-
ysis will shed further light on how the services expected
from future e-health developments can be affected by this
legal framework. In secondary order, this paper will ad-
dress the regulatory regime applicable to the manufacturers
of the devices of the digital operating room. More specifi-
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cally, it will be analyzed whether these manufacturers can
be subjected to the stricter regulations that generally apply
to medical devices.
2. Applicability of the Data Protection
Framework
The data exchanges envisioned within the digital operating
room will be performed in a sensitive environment. The
health records of patients will be handled, a number of
persons will execute divergent tasks and a high degree of
trust is bestowed onto the proper functioning of the devices
that enable the use, exchange and storage of all data gen-
erated in the performance of the activities of the digital
operating room. The collusion of these different factors
raises a number of legal questions with particular regard
to the protection of the patient’s personal data. Therefore,
it will first have to be assessed whether the current legal
framework regarding data protection can be applied to the
activities of the digital operating room.
Within the European Union, the legal framework relat-
ing to the protection of personal data relies on Directive
95/46/EC, also known as the Data Protection Directive [3]
and the national implementations thereof by the Member
States. This directive applies to the processing of personal
data, whereby personal data needs to be understood as be-
ing any information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person. Important for the determination whether
a piece of information constitutes personal data, is there-
fore whether this information can identify a natural person
or at least make him identifiable. A person will gener-
ally be considered to be identified when his identity can be
confirmed immediately so that he can be singled out from
a group. This is the case with, for instance, public sector
identification numbers, such as the identification number of
a national identity card, which are supposed to be uniquely
assigned to one citizen only. As a result, every one of such
identification numbers will directly and solely identify one
citizen.
The concept of identifiability, however, may raise more
discussion. According to the Data Protection Directive,
a person is identifiable when he “can be identified, directly
or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social iden-
tity”. In this case, the citizen will not be identified imme-
diately, but a number of elements, or a combination thereof,
may lead to the indirect identification of the citizen. In such
case, he will be considered to be identifiable [4]. As this
broad definition encompasses an enormous amount of dif-
ferent elements and factors of information, it is clear that
there is only a limited amount of information that could not
be considered as personal data.
When information relates to a citizen, but cannot in any
possible way be traced back or linked to that citizen, this
information is considered to be anonymous [5]. It should
be noted, however, that there is only a very limited amount
of data that is truly anonymous. Even when certain infor-
mation has been depersonalized or encoded, it could still
contain information that could be traced back to the citizen,
thus making the citizen identifiable and therefore making
the information personal data.
In the context of the digital operating room, this could have
implications for the recordings made during surgeries. In,
for instance, an endoscopic procedure, the recorded images
will mainly show a patient’s abdominal and pelvic cavity.
It is clear that these images alone will in most cases not be
able to lead to a direct identification of the patient, unless
the images show a specific disease or deviation that is so
rare and recognizable that it leads to a specific patient. In
that sense, the images recorded are generally not able to
directly identify a patient. However, they could still make
a patient identifiable, if they can be linked to other infor-
mation that could lead to the effective identification of the
patient. For instance, if the recorded images are stored or
in one way or the other linked to the patient’s electronic
health record, they could be traced back to a specific pa-
tient. Also if the filename of the recorded images or the
metadata stored in it makes any referral to information that
could identify the patient, the recorded images will be con-
sidered as personal data under the European Union legal
framework regarding data protection.
It can therefore be found that caution should be paid to
the broad scope of application of the current legal frame-
work on data protection. Even when particular data does
not seem to identify a specific patient, the accompany-
ing metadata and the way in which the data is handled,
could still make the patient identifiable. Such would lead
to the conclusion that personal data is processed in the dig-
ital operating room and that therefore the Data Protection
Directive will be applicable to such data flows.
3. Recording, Storage and Later Use
of Data
One of the main aspects of future e-health developments
is that the use of pervasive and ubiquitous network infras-
tructures in the digital operating room will lead to a sub-
stantial growth in the amount of data that is generated dur-
ing surgery. Such data will then also become more easily
subjected to storage thereof in centralized servers. When
stored, data could potentially be used at a later stage, for
a variety of purposes. For instance, laparoscopic images
recorded during surgery could potentially serve educational
purposes. Alternatively, such images could also be stored in
the patient’s electronic health record. Vital statistics of the
patient during the course of a surgery could also be added
to that same electronic health record to provide a more
complete account of how the procedure went.
These aspects, however, all hold considerable concerns un-
der the applicability of the legal framework on data pro-
tection. In the following, it will be analyzed how the ap-
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plicability of the Data Protection Directive influences the
recording, storage and later use of personal data in the con-
text of the digital operating room.
3.1. Recording Data
With regards to the recording of data including vital statis-
tics and surgical images during surgical procedures, the
first question to be answered is whether the patient’s spe-
cific consent is needed to this end. Specific consent for
the recording of data during a surgical procedure could be
found unnecessary because it is assumed to be part of the
surgery itself, to which the patient already consented. Such
idea of “one consent fits all” should of course be treated
with care as consent principally needs to be specific [6].
The patient can therefore not be assumed to have given his
consent to the recording unless he was already clearly in-
formed on this when giving his consent to the procedure
and if the recording would fit within the scope of the pur-
pose of the procedure itself.
This strict interpretation of consent, however, does not ac-
commodate the importance of research in advancing med-
ical practice. Medical research – including personal data
processing – can benefit public health by identifying pat-
terns of diseases and finding new treatments [7]. To fa-
cilitate such later research, it could be argued to have the
patient provide a broad consent aimed at providing a le-
gal ground for future research. But as such future research
may not yet be designed or performed for months or years
to come [8], it becomes difficult to provide the specific in-
formation required by the patient in order to provide his
informed consent. Indeed, the broader and more general
the information given to the patient, the less informed his
consent will be, thus no longer satisfying this requirement
in personal data processing [9]. As a result, broad con-
sent, despite its importance for the medical and scientific
community, can be considered as problematic from a legal
point of view.
Specifically asking consent for surgical recordings could
also be found unnecessary if the patient is considered to
be unrecognizable on the recordings made by, for instance,
an endoscopic camera. However, as indicated before, there
are other ways in which such information could make the
patient identifiable, such as when the recording’s meta-
data could be linked to the patient’s unique health record.
Such would still qualify the recordings as personal data,
thus requiring consent or another justification ground be-
fore being allowed to be processed. It should therefore be
stressed that consent is in principle required for the record-
ing of data during any surgical procedure and that such
consent cannot just be assumed from the patient’s gen-
eral consent to the surgical procedure in itself. As gen-
uinely anonymous data is extremely rare, it would be ad-
visable to seek specific consent for the recording of surgical
procedures.
This means that the patient needs to be informed on the
purposes of such processing, the duration of the storage
thereof, etc. Given the benefits of an integrated approach,
the patient’s consent to the recording could be given at
the same time as his consent to the surgical procedure in
general, but needs to be clearly differentiated thereof.
3.2. Storage of Data
In past times, operating rooms could be considered as iso-
lated islands, where during a surgical procedure nothing
could get in or leave. The use of networked equipment in
the digital operating room will provide a direct and constant
connection to the outside network, thus providing opportu-
nity to send and receive information in realtime. One pos-
sibility that can be envisioned here is the direct recording
of surgical images and the storage thereof on the hospital’s
network. Such storage is a practice already found in hos-
pitals today [10] and should therefore be addressed from
a legal point of view.
First, this practice raises questions with regards to the du-
ration of the storage of what can be considered as being
the patient’s personal data. As can be found in the legal
provisions of the data protection directive, personal data
collected for processing cannot be stored longer than nec-
essary for achieving the purposes for which they were col-
lected. This means that personal data storage needs to have
a clearly defined end-point, after which the data needs to
be deleted. Apart from the specific purposes of the pro-
cessing, the end-point of health data storage will also be
determined by other factors. For instance, Belgian law re-
quires patients’ files to be stored for thirty years since the
last contact between the healthcare professional and pa-
tient [11].
An important factor in the usefulness of such data storage
is the advancement of the medical state of the art. As sur-
gical practices and procedures are continuously improving,
it would not make sense to use a particular recording of
a procedure for a long period of time, as it will eventually
show outdated practices and procedures. It would therefore
seem advisable to predetermine a specific duration for the
storage of recorded surgical procedures.
On another note, the storage of what can be regarded as
personal data also requires the implementation of specific
measures aimed at safeguarding the security and confiden-
tiality of such data. Security can generally be understood
to include a number of aspects [12]. Integrity, for instance,
ensures that processed information remains accurate and
that no unauthorized modifications are made. Also, avail-
ability ensures that the data is readily accessible and us-
able. Additionally, one can refer to data origin authenti-
cation, which guarantees the origins of the data and non-
repudiation, which ensures that actions committed cannot
be denied by their performers [13].
The general obligation to ensure personal data security re-
quires the data controller to ensure an appropriate level
of security taking into account the current technical state
of the art, the cost of implementing such measures, the
nature of the personal data to be protected and potential
risks. As the digital operating room includes the process-
ing of health data, the appropriate level of security should
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be considered to be high. While the current non-digital OR
also includes the processing of health data, it is precisely
the advanced degree of interconnection between different
devices in and outside of the OR that makes the Digital
OR a more risk-bearing environment. Patient records are
no longer physically transported from a secured archive to
the OR when required, but can be consulted electronically
at all times from anywhere in the hospital. Also the higher
data flow resulting from the convergence and interconnec-
tion of equipment that is currently still used “oﬄine” will
augment the risk potential, for instance in terms of data
breaches.
The Data Protection Directive calls for technical measures
of security, which includes the physical protection of the
personal data by ensuring that non-authorized people can-
not get access to this data [5]. This is, however, an impor-
tant problem in hospital settings, as most areas are open
for public access and mobile devices are often not properly
stored. Physical data security would therefore in this con-
text also require a change in attitude of the actors involved.
Therefore, more purely technical measures are also to be
considered, such as protecting the devices and applications
by encryption and passwords. Such would ensure that unau-
thorized people cannot get access to the personal data, even
if they would get physical access to the devices containing
or being able to access such data. More organizational
measures include raising staff awareness and responsibility
with regards to data security. As an obligation of means,
the data controller is bound to deliver his best efforts rather
than a specific result and must therefore demonstrate that
he delivered the effort that another diligent controller would
have delivered under the same circumstances.
Confidentiality requires the data controller to limit the ac-
cess and processing competencies of the actors under his
authority [5]. This duality requires the personal data to be
off limits for unauthorized persons, but also holds that au-
thorized persons cannot be given unrestricted access. In
general, access to the personal data must be restricted to
what the properly authorized persons need to know for
performing their respective duties. For access provision,
a regular authentication procedure can be followed [14].
This includes registration of the authorized persons, after
which they can present their identification. Such identifi-
cation can be made by information known only to the user
such as passwords or by tokens only held by the user such
as an identification card. Following the authentication ver-
ifying that the claimed identity is real the person will be
authorized and granted access. Such authorization could
be leveled, ensuring that a particular user is only granted
access for as much as his role demands. Actors executing
higher demanding roles will be given higher levels of ac-
cess rights. Categorizing the patient’s personal data can be
useful in developing a modular access matrix. Logging and
tracing mechanisms can be used to verify whether appro-
priate access levels were given and whether only properly
authorized users accessed the data corresponding to their
level of demand.
Additionally, with regards to education, employees should
be instructed on their applicable organizational security
policies and the importance thereof [5]. Given the partic-
ular status of healthcare work, employees should not only
be instructed on general data protection requirements, but
also on requirements stemming from their status as health
professionals. One requirement is that health data must be
obtained at the patient and can only be processed under
the responsibility of health professionals, unless otherwise
consented to. Also, given the importance of the networked
infrastructure of the digital operating room, it is impor-
tant to ensure that these networks are adequately secured
in order to guarantee the security and integrity of the data
transferred over them.
3.3. Later Use of Data
One of the main reasons to store data is to preserve the
possibility of using such data at a later stage. According
to the Data Protection Directive, personal data can only be
used for the specific purposes for which it was collected. As
a result, personal data collected for a specific and justified
purpose cannot be used at a later stage for purposes that
are irreconcilable with the purposes for which the data was
first collected.
To judge whether the original and subsequent purposes of
the data processing are reconcilable, all relevant factors
need to be taken into account, in the first place the data
subject’s reasonable expectations. The difference between
original use and later secondary use needs to be stressed
in the context of the digital operating room as well. If,
for instance, a surgical procedure is recorded for a specific
purpose, then later use of those images will have to be rec-
onciled with the original purposes for which the procedure
was recorded. If such secondary use cannot be reconciled
with the original purposes, the secondary use will have to
be treated as a new processing, thus requiring the fulfill-
ment of all data protection requirements such as consent,
purpose statement, etc.
Further processing of data for historical, statistic or scien-
tific purposes is principally not considered to be irrecon-
cilable and will therefore be allowed, be it under specific
conditions. To make this matter more concrete, the Belgian
use case will be presented as an example of how the further
processing of personal data can be regulated. Note, how-
ever, that this regulation may differ across the European
Union. The reason for this is that there are no harmonizing
legal instruments on this matter, apart from the Clinical
Trials Directive [20].
In the Belgian use case, the Royal Decree of 13 February
2001, executing the Belgian Data Protection Act, deals with
the concept of further processing for historical, statistic or
scientific purposes [15]. In general, Article 3 of the Royal
Decree prefers that anonymous data is used. As such data
cannot be linked back to a specific data subject, it is by
definition no personal data and therefore can be processed
further. If anonymous data cannot suffice to satisfy the
purposes of the processing, Article 4 of the Royal Decree
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calls for the use of encoded data. This is data that can
be linked to a specific data subject, but only by means
of a code. Only when also encoded data does not satisfy
the purposes of the processing, Article 5 allows the use of
non-encoded personal data.
Note that there are three scenarios imaginable [16]. If per-
sonal data is primarily collected for historical, scientific or
statistic purposes as original purposes of the processing,
the use of this data for these historical, statistic or scien-
tific purposes is no secondary use and therefore all sorts
of specific national regulations relating to the issue of fur-
ther processing such as the Belgian Royal Decree will not
apply. If the data is collected for other purposes and used
in secondary order for historical, scientific or statistic pur-
poses that are reconcilable with the original purposes, the
Royal Decree will also not apply as there is not incompat-
ibility between the original purpose and the purpose of the
secondary use for historical, statistic or scientific purposes.
The Royal Decree only applies when data is collected for
specific purposes and later used secondarily for historical,
scientific or statistic purposes that are not reconcilable with
the primary purposes.
4. Device Manufacturer Regulations
Apart from addressing the main concerns resulting from
the application of the principles of the Data Protection Di-
rective to the developments of the digital operating room,
this paper also aims to look at this matter from the per-
spective of the manufacturer of the devices that make up
such digital operating rooms. In the following, it will be
analyzed to what regulatory regime such devices and their
manufacturers are subjected.
While general healthcare regulations are mostly aimed at
establishing the rights and responsibilities of patients, med-
ical professionals and medical institutions such as hospitals,
one should not forget about the legal position of the manu-
facturers of the many products that enable or facilitate the
provision of healthcare, including the devices and applica-
tions that will play a role in the digital operating room. The
reason why these product manufacturers are typically not
included in general healthcare regulations is that they nor-
mally do not directly engage in contracts with the patient.
Medical professionals or institutions engage with prod-
uct manufacturers through contracts spanning from regular
sales of goods contracts to elaborate service contracts that
are mostly governed by standard contract law. Direct con-
tact between patients and product manufacturer is generally
only found in certain cases of the manufacturer’s liability
for faulty products.
However, certain sectors apply specific rules to manufac-
turers that aim to bring products on the market in that
sector. Especially in the healthcare sector, one can un-
derstand the need to preserve certain standards of quality.
Surgical scalpels and hypodermic needles need to be fully
sterile, monitoring and diagnostic equipment needs to be
reliable, etc.
At the level of the European Union, a number of direc-
tives provide the basic legal framework that needs to en-
sure a high level of quality of medical devices in order to
guarantee the protection of human health and safety. Such
directives provide basic lists of requirements that need to
be met before medical devices can be put on the market.
When devices are marketed, they must also bear the CE
mark as a proof of certification, although self-certification
is possible in certain cases. Devices are divided over four
categories (I, IIa, IIb and III) according to the risks their
use poses to the patients. The criteria used for such classi-
fication take into account the invasiveness of the device, the
intended duration of its use, whether the device is active or
passive, etc. [17].
While such requirements listed do provide a basic idea of
what one should be able to expect from a compliant medi-
cal device, there are virtually no technical details included.
For instance, it is stated that devices delivered in a ster-
ile state must be manufactured and sterilized using an ap-
propriate and valid method, yet apart from a reference to
standards developed by standardization bodies such as the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) it is
left open to interpretation by the Member States to fur-
ther define such method. As a result, Member States need
to incorporate and further develop these requirements in
their national legal system. A Competent Authority report-
ing to the Minister of Health will be formed in all Mem-
ber States to monitor the adoption and application of these
principles.
In Belgium, the Federal Agency for Medicines and Health
Products (FAMHP) evaluates, approves, follows and con-
trols the requests for clinical trials for medicines and
health products. This agency follows medical devices and
medicines from their R&D phase to their introduction on
the market and performs inspections to ensure the quality
of these devices and medicines. Every product manufac-
turer aiming to bring a medical device or medicine to the
Belgian market will therefore have to apply to the FAMHP.
To this end, medical devices are defined as any instrument,
equipment, material or other article used on its own or
jointly, including software required for it to function cor-
rectly, which is intended by the manufacturer to be used on
humans for the purposes of diagnostic, prevention, control,
treating or diminishing an illness, an injury or a handicap,
of studying, replacing or modifying part of the anatomy
or a physiological process and of controlling conception
and whose principal intended action in or on the human
body is not obtained by pharmacological or immunological
means or by metabolism but whose function can be assisted
in such a way [18]. This includes accessories specifically
intended by its manufacturer to be used with a device to
enable the use of that device in line with the instructions
of the manufacturer of the device.
Given this broad definition, taken literally from the Euro-
pean Union directive, the scope of the regulatory compe-
tence of the FAMHP spans from the simplest of tools such
as tongue depressors to much more complex diagnostic and
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monitoring devices and computer systems. The devices en-
visioned in the digital operating room and their accessories
may therefore also have to comply with the existing regu-
lations applied by the FAMHP.
Taken that a digital operating room could be defined as in-
cluding the development of technologies for central external
monitoring equipment and the network infrastructure that
enables image distribution and collaboration, it will have
to be assessed whether such can fall under the scope of the
FAMHP. Here, Article 7 of the Royal Decree of 18 March
1999 refers to system manufacturers as “all natural or legal
persons reassembling devices with a CE marking, depend-
ing on their destination and the limitations of use granted
by their manufacturers, in order to launch them as a system
or a kit”. Such systems are subject to a mere notification
and do not need to go through the whole certification pro-
cedure. However, if the system contains components that
do not carry the CE mark or if they are used in a manner
incompatible with their originally intended use, the system
is considered as a separate medical device, thus subject
to the standard procedure. As the digital operating room
would integrate different medical devices into a central hub,
such hub could be considered as a system. The envisioned
network infrastructure for image distribution and collabo-
ration will also be integrated in this hub and will be used
in collaboration with medical devices, thus becoming part
of the medical system. As the central hub in itself will not
directly come into contact with the patient, it could be seen
as a “Class I medical device”.
Looking at the Belgian use case, one will have to refer to
the Act concerning Experiments on the Human Person [19].
While this act is the Belgian implementation of the so-
called Clinical Trials Directive [20], the Belgian legislator
has chosen to expand the scope of the directive from “clin-
ical trials, including multi-centre trials, on human subjects
involving medicinal products” towards every type of exper-
iment involving human subjects with the goal to expand
knowledge on medical practices. As a result, every test,
study or research involving human subjects that is aimed at
expanding knowledge on the practices of health professions
will be subjected to the scope of this act. Given this broad
definition, one will have to assess whether trials concern-
ing the digital operating room hub or other applications
would constitute an experiment under the scope of the Act
concerning Experiments on the Human Person.
While tests should be understood as referring to medicinal
products, studies and research also apply to non-medicinal
trials. However, nor the act, nor the preparatory works
provide a clear definition of these trials. The act does,
however, refer to medical devices [19]. Like trials involv-
ing medicinal products, studies and research focusing on
medical devices should receive a positive advice from an
ethical committee and from the Minister of Health. More
concretely, it could be argued that one should follow the
procedure stated in the Royal Decree on medical devices,
which leads to notification to the FAMHP, as discussed
before.
Two other conditions that need to be fulfilled for the appli-
cation of the Act concerning Experiments on the Human
Person include the goal to expand knowledge on medi-
cal practices and the involvement of human subjects. If
the experiment is aimed at advancing the state of the art
in medical practice, then the condition of knowledge ex-
pansion will be fulfilled. The condition of human involve-
ment is fulfilled as soon as the experiment physically in-
volves a born and living human subject. The mere pro-
cessing of his personal health data, for instance, will not
lead to the application of this act. When the Act concern-
ing Experiments on the Human Person applies, the human
subject participating in the study or research will have to
grant his written prior informed consent [19]. He also en-
joys specific protection, such as that that experiment needs
to abide by the proportionality principle that risks and
benefits need to be weighed off against each other, etc.
Further responsibilities and liabilities are imposed on the
promoter.
5. Practical Consequences
While the previous sections discuss the more theoretical
aspects of this matter, the question remains what this means
in practice. How are professionals in the telecommunica-
tions sector affected by the advent of telesurgery prac-
tices? Which dangers need to be heeded when engaging
toward the implementation of a Digital OR solution?
This section will summarily consider the practical im-
plications of the evolutions discussed here. First, it is
reminded that device manufacturers must comply with
European and national legislation in order to deliver med-
ical devices. Second, data protection concerns must be
taken into account. Third, potential liability issues need to
be minded.
5.1. Device Regulations
The manufacturers of the devices, tools and applications of
the Digital OR must assess whether their product can con-
stitute a medical device according to existing legislation in
this field. As this legislation is not very much harmonized
at the level of the European Union, it must be ensured that
both the scarce European legislation in this field – for in-
stance concerning the requirement to bear the CE mark –
and the applicable national legislation of the Member States
are complied with. In most cases, this will entail a sub-
mission to the competent national agencies concerned with
monitoring medical devices and medicines. Only when
the applicable rules and procedures are complied with and
authorization – where required – is obtained, the medical
devices can be offered to customers in the healthcare sector.
5.2. Data Protection
As noted before, the devices of the Digital OR are becom-
ing more interconnected, meaning that devices that used to
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perform their tasks isolated from other devices are increas-
ingly becoming part of a network of data exchanges. Even
a simple heart rate monitor could be modified to record
its readings – or anomalies in particular – and store them
on the centralized hospital network. The result of this is
that the data flows in the Digital OR are very likely - or
even certain - to involve personal data processing opera-
tions. These data flows and the subsequent use of that data
must therefore comply with the requirements of European
and national data protection legislation.
More concretely, this means that it is important to deter-
mine who will serve as the data controller to that personal
data processing operation, as such data controller will hold
the final responsibility over the processing. This data con-
troller will have to determine the purposes of the process-
ing, the duration of storage, ensure that no data excessive
to the purposes is processed, etc. Another pivotal element
to a fair and lawful processing of personal data is that of
the legitimate justification ground. While specific justifi-
cation grounds do exist for use in a medical context – for
instance in case of medical urgency – the patient’s consent
will undoubtedly serve as the most important justification
ground. Health data is considered to be sensitive personal
data and the processing thereof must therefore comply with
stricter regulations. At European level, for instance, it is
stipulated that consent for the processing of sensitive per-
sonal data must be explicit. National implementations of
this provision, however, may differ. In Belgium, for in-
stance, written consent is required [3]. Another duty of
the data controller is to ensure that the patient’s rights
as a data subject are respected and that proper notifica-
tion is made to the competent national Data Protection
Authority.
The data controller is defined as the party to the process-
ing that decides the means and purposes of that processing.
Within the context of the Digital OR, this will generally be
the surgeon, or even the hospital. While recent evolutions
make it difficult to apply static concepts such as that of data
controller to complex data processing operations, it is clear
that this role belongs to a medical professional and princi-
pally not to the manufacturers of medical devices. However,
the fact that the hospital and the health professionals princi-
pally share the burden of the task of data controller does not
mean that other parties, such as the device manufacturers
do not need to mind data protection rules. If these manu-
facturers become involved in performing the processing on
behalf of another party, they could still be considered as
processors. If, for instance, a medical device assists in the
processing of personal data, its service provider could be
viewed as a processor if his device only serves as a means
for the processing. And if the device requires additional
data to be processed, it could even be viewed to determine
the purposes of the processing as well, thus leading to its
service provider becoming a (joint) controller [4]. Device
manufacturers are therefore advised to clearly define their
role within the personal data processing operations their
devices will become involved in.
5.3. Liability
The manufacturers of the devices of the Digital OR will
also have to mind potential liabilities for their products.
Under general contract law, these manufacturers are bound
to a duty of conform delivery, meaning that their prod-
ucts need to be without visible or hidden flaws and that
they must live up to the expectations of the product agreed
upon. Especially in a medical context, devices will need to
demonstrate a high degree of reliability.
Outside of the strict contractual framework, product man-
ufacturers can also be held liable for damages caused by
their faulty products. This product liability can be consid-
ered as an objective liability, as it does not require a fault
on the manufacturer’s behalf. The party suffering damages
will only have to prove that those damages were caused by
a fault in the product. Given the extra-contractual nature
of this liability, it serves as a means for patient to direct
a claim for compensation for damages sustained directly to
the product manufacturers, as they will generally not have
entered into a contractual bond with this party.
By converging different services into fewer devices, the
Digital OR is a much more complex environment. Device
manufacturers will need to adapt to these complexities and
ensure that their products are compliant to the standards
expected in the medical sector.
6. Conclusion
Technological developments such as the Internet of Things
will soon make their way into hospitals worldwide. In what
can be referred to as the digital operating room, different
devices will become interconnected and will create, store
and exchange data on a larger scale than has ever been
possible before. Such data flows can, however, also pose
concerns with regards to the patient’s privacy. To this end,
this paper has first analyzed the applicability of the cur-
rent legal framework on data protection to the data flows
that can be found in such digital operating room. Here,
the focus was put on the concept of identifiability. As
the Data Protection Directive requires the data subject to
the identified or to be reasonably identifiable in order for
data to be considered as personal data, it is precisely this
concept of identifiability that can determine the true scope
of the notion of personal data. Indeed, in this context it
was found that data that is often considered not to iden-
tify a patient and thus to be anonymous can still be used
to lead to the identification of a particular patient, when
coupled with other data such as metadata or when linked
to the patient’s health record. The applicability of the Data
Protection Directive should therefore always be assumed,
given the broad spectrum of its applicability. In particular,
this paper focused on the recording, storage and later use
of data in the digital operating room. Here, it was found
that such data recording principally requires additional spe-
cific consent from the patient. Also the storage is bound
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to particular requirements, such as that of limited storage
duration and the adoption of specific security and confi-
dentiality measures. When data is stored for future use, it
needs to be ensured that such secondary use can be rec-
onciled with the primary purposes for which the data was
collected. Finally, with regards to the status of the manu-
facturers of the devices of the digital operating room, it was
found that such devices can fall under the specific status of
medical equipment, which means that they may have to
comply with a number of specific requirements following
from the sensitive nature of such equipment.
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